Chapitre 3 : La cryogénie est-elle faite pour moi ?

The mathematics of cryopreservation creates an interesting paradox for decision-making. Even extremely low probability of success generates infinite expected value because the alternative offers exactly zero chance of continuation. This isn't rhetorical flourish; it's straightforward consequence of how we should evaluate options involving irreversible loss.

‍

The expected value framework

Expected value calculations multiply probability by outcome value. A 50% chance of winning €100 has expected value of €50. A 1% chance of winning €10,000 has expected value of €100. Even low probability can generate high expected value if the outcome is sufficiently valuable.

Now apply this to existence itself. What value does continued consciousness hold? You might quantify it various ways, but any honest assessment generates extremely high value. Years of experience, relationships, learning, and sensation constitute profound worth.

Multiply even modest probability of restoration by this value and expected value becomes substantial. A 10% chance of restoration with fifty additional years of healthy life generates expected value of five years. A 1% chance still generates six months. Even 0.1% generates about two weeks of expected additional life.

But the real insight goes deeper. The value of continued existence might be effectively infinite from individual perspective. You experience all futures where you exist and none where you don't. The subjective expected value of any non-zero probability of continuation vastly exceeds certain termination.

‍

The zero alternative

Conventional death offers exactly 0% chance of continuation. Not low probability, not uncertain probability, but definitively zero. Once biological information degrades past certain point, no conceivable intervention can restore what's lost. The person is permanently, irreversibly gone.

This creates stark comparison. Cryopreservation offers uncertain but non-zero probability. Maybe 1%, maybe 10%, maybe 50% depending on assumptions about future technology. The exact number matters less than that it's not zero.

From decision theory perspective, any positive probability of good outcome beats certain loss when outcome value is sufficiently high. This holds even if probability seems very low. The alternative being exactly zero changes everything.

‍

The downside analysis

Rational evaluation requires examining not just upside but downside. What do you lose if cryopreservation fails? Money spent on preservation that could have served other purposes. Emotional investment in possibility that doesn't materialize. Perhaps opportunity costs of suboptimal end-of-life choices made to optimize preservation.

But compare this to downside of skipping preservation if it would have worked. You're permanently gone despite restoration being possible. Everyone who loved you permanently lost you when continuation was achievable. All future experiences, relationships, and possibilities eliminated unnecessarily.

The asymmetry is stark. Failed preservation costs resources. Missed preservation when it would have worked costs everything. The downside comparison heavily favors attempting preservation even with low success probability.

‍

The rationality of long shots

We accept long-shot bets regularly when payoffs justify them. People buy lottery tickets despite infinitesimal winning chances. Entrepreneurs start businesses despite high failure rates. Researchers pursue difficult problems despite low solution probability.

These decisions make sense when potential payoff exceeds expected costs even accounting for low probability. Cryopreservation follows identical logic. The payoff, continued existence, dwarfs the costs even with conservative probability estimates.

Critics sometimes claim cryopreservation represents irrational hope or denial. But the math suggests opposite. Refusing preservation when you value continued existence represents irrational acceptance of certain loss over uncertain possibility. The truly irrational choice is guaranteed permanent termination when alternatives exist.

‍

How low is too low?

At what probability does preservation become irrational? This depends on personal values and cost structures, but the threshold sits surprisingly low. If preservation costs represent truly significant hardship, if they genuinely undermine family welfare or prevent important present goals, then even 5-10% probability might not justify expense.

But for most people considering preservation, costs are manageable. They're spending discretionary income that would otherwise fund entertainment, conveniences, or luxuries. In this context, what probability threshold justifies preservation versus spending on alternative goods?

For many, even 1% suffices. One chance in hundred of continued existence, additional decades of experience, reunion with future loved ones, seeing how humanity develops—this clearly outweighs another restaurant meal, vacation, or consumer purchase. The value ratio isn't even close.

Some might require higher probability, say 10% or 25%, before preservation feels worthwhile. This is legitimate personal weighting. But requiring certainty or near-certainty before pursuing preservation misunderstands the decision structure. You're not comparing high probability success versus failure. You're comparing non-zero probability versus zero.

‍

The information problem

We don't actually know cryopreservation's success probability. The technology is unproven. No one has been preserved, stored for decades, and successfully revived. We're making educated guesses based on current preservation quality, reasonable extrapolation of technological progress, and theoretical understanding of information preservation.

Different people estimate success probability very differently. Optimists might say 50% or higher. Pessimists might say 1% or lower. These estimates depend on beliefs about future technological capability, trust in preservation organizations, assessment of current vitrification quality, and assumptions about societal continuation.

But even at pessimistic probabilities, preservation generates positive expected value given the alternative. If you think there's even 0.5% chance of success, that's one chance in two hundred of continued existence versus zero. The math still favors preservation if you value continuation and can afford the costs.

The uncertainty should encourage humility about predictions but shouldn't paralyze decision-making. We make important choices under uncertainty constantly. We invest in educations that might not pay off. We start relationships that might fail. We pursue careers despite uncertain outcomes.

Cryopreservation involves similar uncertainty but with clearer upside-downside asymmetry. The worst case is wasted resources. The best case is continued existence. The alternative is certain permanent loss. Under this structure, reasonable people should favor preservation even with substantial uncertainty about success probability.